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THE CAMPAIGN-FINANCE CRUCIBLE: IS 
LAISSEZ FAIR? 
Jamin B. Raskin* 
UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM. By 
Bradley A. Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001. Pp. xiv, 
286. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $17.95. 
VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE. By Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres. New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press. 2002. Pp. x, 303. $29.95. 
The 2001 passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
("BCRA"), popularly known as "McCain-Feingold," set the stage for 
a momentous constitutional conflict in the United States Supreme 
Court in the 2003-04 Term. Among other things, the new legislation 
bans "soft money" contributions to the national political parties by 
corporations, labor unions, and individuals; prohibits state parties that 
are authorized to a�cept such contributions to spend the proceeds on 
activities related to federal elections; forbids federal candidates to par­
ticipate in raising soft money; doubles the amount of "hard money" an 
individual can contribute in a federal election from $1 ,000 to $2,000 
and increases the amount an individual can give in aggregate to all 
federal candidates, parties, and political action committees ("PACs") 
in a year from $25,000 to $30,000; bans all federal contributions by 
minors; and prohibits the expenditure of corporation and union treas­
ury funds on "electioneering communications," defined as television­
or radio-broadcast advertisements that refer to a federal candidate (or 
candidates) and appear within thirty days of a primary election or sixty 
days of a general election.1 
The new Jaw opens a pandora's box of constitutional brain teasers 
that the Court will have to solve. But it takes our polity further down a 
certain road. This is the road of compromise regulation of our 
multibillion-dollar campaign-finance regime. On this middling path, 
we accept the fundamental and intractable role of private money in 
public elections, but we do our best to regulate both its attendant 
"corruption," defined narrowly as the trading of campaign contribu-
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. A.B. 1983, J.D. 
1987, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. See generally Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 -56 (2003). 
1532 
May2003] The Campaign-Finance Crucible 1533 
tions for political influence and favor, and also its attendant "appear­
ance of corruption."2 This latter concept is odd since we do not usually 
conclude that the appearance of a problem creates a sufficiently 
compelling interest to <,lVerride freedom of speech. For example, while 
we can certainly legislate within the bounds of the First Amendment 
to criminalize obscenity3 or incitement to imminent lawless action,4 we 
cannot constitutionally criminalize the appearance of obscenity or the 
appearance of incitement to imminent lawless action. How can pre­
venting the appearance of corruption constitute an interest sufficiently 
compelling to justify burdens on speech? 
In any event, we have chosen the middle path of modest regulation 
against two alternative paths that lead in opposite directions: a totally 
deregulated free market in campaign contributions and expenditures 
in which political money is treated as simply a proxy and vehicle for 
speech; and a public-finance regime in which we do our best to abolish 
the power of private money and treat campaigns as a public process 
like the election itself. 
If the Supreme Court upholds the BCRA, we will likely continue 
on this middle road. Individual private-campaign contributions will 
grow rapidly, perhaps even doubling in the 2004 elections given the 
increased giving limits. Corporations and unions, perhaps now forbid­
den to contribute soft money and produce "electioneering" ads, will 
have a diminished role for a while but will soon enough find other 
ways to make their influence felt. We will see no sharp policy depar­
tures that either deregulate or substitute for the present market in 
campaign-finance capital. 
Yet, if the Court invalidates large chunks of the BCRA, as it 
is likely to do, the forces of reform will have to conclude that the 
century-long effort to contain and channel private money has reached 
a dead end. The only viable progressive alternative to the status quo 
will be some kind of national public-financing regime written in such a 
way as to permit candidates to opt out and go private if they like, as is 
required by the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,5 but otherwise 
gives candidates the public means to run a serious campaign in return 
for forswearing private contributions. In the meantime, the ambigui­
ties, contradictions, and gaps in the current compromise regime will 
give greater political impetus to Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) 
and other conservatives who think that political money, regardless of 
its source or its destination, should run free like a river. After the 
invalidation of the BCRA, reform will focus on creating a parallel 
2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976) (per curiam). 
3. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
4. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1 976) (per curiam). 
1534 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:1532 
public regime and conservative resistance will focus on throwing away 
even the skeletal regulations we have. 
Thus, it is a fine time to examine two books - Bradley Smith's 
Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform,6 which will 
appeal to conservatives, and Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres's Voting 
with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance,7 which may 
intrigue liberals - that imagine sweeping changes to our campaign­
finance regime. 
I. 
In Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform, Bradley 
Smith has written an impassioned and eloquent defense of a free mar­
ket in the financing of America's political campaigns. One is tempted 
to call Professor Smith's work the definitive libertarian statement 
about campaign finance: indeed, the Cato Institute and other self­
described libertarian groups fighting campaign-finance reform have 
ardently promoted his ideas.8 But there are revealing evasions in his 
argument - specifically about the role of private corporations, the 
public self-subsidies engineered by incumbents, and the acceptability 
of compulsory-disclosure rules - that complicate and cast doubt on 
his libertarianism. These equivocations make him, in the final analysis, 
more the conservative champion of the status quo than the visionary 
of a systematically deregulated libertarian regime of money in politics 
or the apostle of law-and-economics seeking to abolish rent-seeking 
behavior. While he succeeds in exposing the illiberal "folly" of 
much conventional reform, he ultimately fails to show how we might 
redesign public institutions to open up our politics to new voices, new 
choices, greater participation, and more political freedom. 
Professor Smith has served since May of 2000 as a Republican­
designated member on the Federal Election Commission, a position 
he secured over the protests of the Brennan Center for Justice, Vice 
President Al Gore, and other advocates of reform. From this perch, 
Commissioner Smith battles greater campaign regulation. Yet one 
hopes that his short-term regulatory agenda does not keep him from 
6. Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. 
7. Both are professors at Yale Law School. 
8. See, e.g., BRADLEY A. SMITH, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: FAULTY 
ASSUMPTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis Paper 
No. 238, 1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa238.html (last visited May 30, 
2003). The Cato Institute has featured Smith on numerous occasions, including upon publi­
cation of Unfree Speech at an author's forum on March 21, 2001, where I acted as respon­
dent. See also Bradley A. Smith, Should "Committing Politics" Be a Crime? The Cases for 
Deregulating Campaign Finance, FREE SPEECH & ELECrlON L. PRAC. G ROUP NEWS (Fed­
eralist Society, Wash., D.C.) , Feb. 27, 1997, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/ 
practicegroupnewsletters/freespeech&electionlaw/fs010202.htm (last visited May 30, 2003) .  
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spelling out a more robust and systematic political libertarianism that 
could be a meaningful contribution to public discourse. 
Smith's greatest offering in this book lies in his polemical demoli­
tion of the standard rhetoric of campaign-finance reform. He makes 
mincemeat of the foggy complaint that "campaign spending is too 
high" (p. 41), showing that Americans spend "two to three times as 
much money each year on the purchase of potato chips," and that 
Philip Morris and Procter & Gamble "spend roughly the same amount 
on advertising as is spent by all political parties and candidates" (p. 
42). He makes a good case that as a society, we spend too little money 
on political communication and campaigning, a point we must keep in 
mind (p. 45). 
Smith also debunks the claim that "money buys elections," point­
ing to dozens of congressional campaigns where the lesser-financed 
candidate won, and arguing that the normally high correlation 
between campaign spending and victory is more likely to reflect the 
popularity of the winning candidate than to create it (pp. 48-51). 
Although Smith does not mention it ,  Rob Richie and the Center for 
Voting and Democracy have forcefully documented that campaign 
funding is a substantially less-important factor in general election 
victory in congressional races than the engineered partisan and 
demographic makeup of legislative districts.9 If you give major-party 
congressional nominees the choice between having a favorably gerry­
mandered district and a fundraising disadvantage, or an unfavorably 
gerrymandered district and a fundraising advantage, all the smart ones 
will choose the former. (Of course, most incumbents are able to get 
both.) 
Grabbing the bull by the horns, Smith attacks the assumption that 
"[m]oney is a corrupting influence on the legislature" (p. 51). Here, 
corruption cannot mean the "personal enrichment of a legislator in 
exchange for a vote" (p. 52), since that kind of dirty dealing is already 
proscribed by laws against bribery. Smith asserts "[w]hat reformers 
mean by 'corruption' is that legislators react to the wishes of constitu­
ents; or what, in other circumstances, might be called 'responsiveness.' 
What makes this particular incidence of responsiveness 'corrupt' is 
that the constituents involved have taken an active role in supporting 
the candidate's campaign for election" with money contributions (p. 
52). Smith illustrates what he sees as the reformers' fallacy by citing a 
Common Cause bulletin reporting $14.2 million in campaign contribu-
9. See Rob Richie, Money Doesn't Buy Love - Nor Most Elections, ROLL CALL (D.C.), 
July 21, 1997 (concluding that partisan politics ultimately proves more decisive in winning 
votes than the size of campaign expenditures), available at http://www.fairvote.org/reports/ 
monopoly/richie2.html (last visited May 30, 2003). 
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tions from the "sugar and peanut industries" over several elections.1 0  
But, Smith argues, this evidence is meaningless with respect to corrup­
tion because "[n]o effort is made to show that any congressman or 
senator, let alone a majority, voted against his conscience or the 
wishes of his constituency in exchange for votes on the issue" (p. 53). 
(I think he actually meant to write "in exchange for campaign contri­
butions.") 
Smith is correct that if corruption simply means compromising the 
moral purity or "true beliefs" of the politician, then the claim that 
money corrupts legislatures seems highly doubtful. The kinds of politi­
cians that receive huge sums from agri-business interests are the kinds 
of politicians that would robotically serve these interests anyway. 
Corporate power does not have to buy politicians in American elec­
tions; it spawns them. Thus, although Smith fails to provide us with a 
definition of corruption, we need a definition that does not focus on 
the impressionable soul of the politician but rather on keeping the 
channels of popular democracy safe from capture by predatory elite 
factions, which are always made up of both politicians and the broader 
interests they serve. 
After tracking the "faulty assumptions of campaign finance 
reform," Smith argues that past reforms have "actually exacerbated 
many of the problems they were intended to solve, and created new 
problems along the way" (p. 65). This is the familiar conservative 
argument of "perversity": that the effects of any well-intended reform 
will just make matters worse. Here Smith is not nearly so convincing. 
In the first place, he ignores important structural reforms of the past, 
notably the federal-statutory ban beginning in 1907 with the Tillman 
Act on any contributions from corporation treasuries directly to can­
didate campaign treasuries.11 
Smith's silence on the Tillman Act is eerie. Does he favor such a 
ban on corporate contributions to federal candidates or does he 
oppose it? Has this ban succeeded in breaking the cash nexus between 
the for-profit corporate sector and legislative politics? Is this a permis­
sible and desirable goal? Although he explores and attacks practically 
every other campaign-finance regulation, he tiptoes around this one. If 
corporations have the political free-speech rights of citizens, surely 
this policy collides with Smith's free-speech principle. While he quite 
amazingly takes issue with the Court's democracy-reinforcing decision 
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,12 which affirmed a 
10. See Pocketbook Politics, COMMON CAUSE, Feb. 24, 1998 (summarizing campaign 
contributions from various special-interest groups), available at http://www.commoncause. 
org/pressroom/profiles.html (last visited May 30, 2003). 
11. See Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended 
at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2003)). 
12. P. 150; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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Michigan law forbidding corporate-treasury expenditures on candi­
date races, he does not tell us what he thinks of the Tillman Act's ban 
on direct corporate-treasury contributions to candidate campaigns. 
Smith's shyness about this fundamental problem may have been born 
of his ambitions to serve on the FEC, but perhaps it reflects an 
unwillingness to follow his libertarian rhetoric to its logical conclusion: 
if corporations are political citizens, then they should be able to give 
on an unlimited basis not just to initiative and referendum campaigns 
but directly to candidates as well. 
This would be a most revealing confession on his part if he would 
own up to it, for it is clear that an unhampered "corporate democracy" 
is the kind of society conservative libertarians have in mind. Smith 
himself likens inequalities in political wealth and media power to the 
distribution of natural talents and attributes in society: "There are a 
great many sources of political influence. These include direct 
personal attributes, such as speaking and writing ability, good looks, 
personality, time and energy, and organizational skills, as well as 
acquired attributes, such as wealth, celebrity, and access to or control 
of the popular press" (p. 1077). We are thus implicitly invited to 
humanize corporations, naturalize their wealth and power, and consti­
tutionalize their right to participate in politics. 
Yet, unwilling to follow the logic of his argument all the way to 
lifting the ban on corporate contributions to candidates, Smith instead 
stacks up unconvincing policy arguments against reforms past and 
present. Focusing on the 1 974 amendments to the 1 971 Federal 
Election Campaign Act, 13 he argues that contribution limits, like the 
$1,000 limit on giving to candidates for Congress, "favor incumbents 
by making it relatively harder for challengers to raise money and 
thereby make credible runs for office" (p. 66). This claim is deeply 
suspect since incumbents have overwhelmingly disproportionate 
access to large givers, which means that contribution limits will tend to 
even things out a bit. Now that the $1,000 giving limit has been lifted 
to $2,000 with McCain-Feingold1 4 for example, incumbents are able to 
rake in large numbers of $2,000 checks where their prior sums were 
half of that. Smith may have in mind certain Republican challengers to 
Democratic incumbents who would like to be able to draw on several 
$100,000 contributors. But contribution limits obviously help most 
challenger candidates marginally close the gap with incumbents, even 
though incumbents continue to enjoy extraordinary fundraising advan-
13.  Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (1974) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225m, 86 
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (2003))). 
14. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441 a(a)(l). 
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tages.15 Lifting contribution limits would, on the whole, make matters 
worse for challengers and better for incumbents who have broad 
access to big donors and vast amounts of highly motivated special­
interest money. 
Many of Smith's other claims about the consequences of past 
reform are equally doubtful: that reform has "inhibited the robust 
discussion of public issues" (p. 73), or that it has "promoted influence 
peddling, reduced legislative accountability, and caused dereliction of 
duty" (p. 76). The basis for this latter set of claims is that, by forcing 
candidates to collect contributions in tiny $1,000 morsels rather than 
in, say, efficiently satisfying $250,000 chunks, the candidates must 
"divert the legislative attention away from official duties and toward 
fundraising" (p. 78). The need to impress so many different donors, 
Smith asserts, sounding suddenly like a Common Cause lobbyist, also 
reduces the willingness of officials to take prudent risks: it "promote[s] 
shirking by increasing the pressure on legislators not to offend 
contributors" (p. 78). 
Ironically, the interests that Smith invokes in saving legislators' 
time for actual legislation make a much better fit for arguments on 
behalf of public financing that Smith cavalierly rejects elsewhere in his 
book. These points make hollow arguments for getting rid of contribu­
tion limits, however, since big donors will demand much more time 
from legislators and can themselves - at least on an individual basis 
- increase the "pressure on legislators not to offend" (p. 78). In any 
event, legislators will not pass up the opportunity to make the $1,000 
calls just because a $5,000 check has already arrived! It is nearly im­
possible for anyone with even passing familiarity with politics in the 
real world to believe that raising contribution limits will reduce the 
amount of time the ordinary politician spends on fundraising. 
One perverse effect of 1970s reform correctly identified by Smith is 
the way the reforms propelled "the phenomenon of the 'millionaire 
candidate' - Donald Trump, John Corzine, Ross Perot, and Steve 
Forbes" (p. 70). Since the Court in Buckley v. Valeo upheld the $1,000 
campaign-contribution limit16 but struck down all limits on what a 
candidate could spend on his or her own campaign from personal 
funds,17 millionaires like Michael Huffington, Herb Kohl, or Jay 
Rockefeller have automatically become "viable candidate[s] precisely 
15. See, e.g., Common Cause, Reporter's Guide to Money in Politics Campaign 2000: 
Incumbent Advantage, at http://www.commoncause.org/pressroom/congress_advantage.html 
(last visited May 30, 2003) (concluding that incumbents benefit from a marked funding ad­
vantage). 
16. 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (per curiam). 
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52. 
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because personal wealth provides a direct campaign advantage that 
cannot be offset by a large contributor to the opposing candidate" (p. 
70). 
Smith is not actually troubled by the broad plutocratic implications 
of this development, the idea that we may be drifting into de facto 
wealth and property qualifications - not for voting but for running 
for public office. What troubles him is that the politically active 
billionaire is constrained in his or her options. "Ross Perot's 1992 
presidential campaign was possible because Perot was able to spend 
millions to advance his own candidacy. However,· the contribution 
limits upheld in Buckley made it illegal for Perot to bankroll the 
campaign of a more plausible challenger, such as General Colin 
Powell" (p. 70). Similarly, Smith is up in arms about the case of "mil­
lionaire publisher Malcolm S. 'Steve' Forbes, Jr., a political neophyte" 
and candidate for the Republican nomination for president in 1996 
who 
indicated that he would not have sought the nomination had former con­
gressman and secretary of housing and urban development Jack Kemp 
decided to run . . . .  Had Forbes been able to donate to Kemp the $25 
million he planned to spend -on his own campaign, Kemp might have run 
and would quite likely have been a frontrunner for the Republican 
nomination. (p. 71) 
Smith recognizes that millionaires have achieved a central place of 
honor in the current regime. Nonetheless, he invites us to believe that 
the principal injury inflicted by this system is to their disappointed 
close friends who should enjoy unfettered access to these private 
millions as well. 
But what about everyone else? Can our circle of democratic empa­
thy extend beyond the class of people that includes Colin Powell and 
Jack Kemp (not billionaires, it is true, but certainly millionaires)? 
What about those Americans who have something meaningful to con­
tribute in politics but have neither millions of dollars nor generous 
close friends with billions in the bank? 
In truth, the question of how this or that reform affects our politics 
is rhetorical window dressing for Smith. The beating, if sometimes 
muffled, heart of his book is a categorical and absolutist First 
Amendment defense of the unlimited right to give and spend private 
money in politics. Thus, Smith does not care that most money in cam­
paigns comes from a rich elite, less than one-tenth of one percent of 
the people,18 or that 90% of the American people do not participate in 
fundraising at all (p. 74) .  It is of no serious moment to him whether 
incumbents are benefited or hurt, whether elections are competitive or 
not, or whether politics is open to the vast many or the well-heeled 
18. ACKERMAN & AY RES, p. 31.  
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few. The key point is that anyone should be able to give as much 
money to any candidate or group as he or she wishes, and every 
candidate should be able to spend whatever liquid capital he or she 
has in order to win. Smith deduces this principle from the First 
Amendment (pp. 137-66) and understands it as inescapable regardless 
of its worldly consequences. 
Smith grounds this principle in the prevailing free-speech theory of 
money in politics (pp. 137-66). He endorses the Buckley v. Valeo 
majority's across-the-board invalidation of spending limits as a "direct 
quantity restriction"19 on political speech. He castigates the Court for 
validating $1 ,000 contribution limits in the interest of fighting "corrup­
tion and the appearance of corruption" (p. 33). Smith challenges 
Judge J. Skelly Wright's opinion in the appeals court ruling in Buckley 
that "nothing in the First Amendment commits us to the dogma that 
money is speech."20 "If spending money were not a form of speech," 
Smith writes, "the First Amendment would become hollow for all but 
newspapers and other press outlets, since any effort to spread one's 
message, through advertising or pamphleteering, could be stripped of 
First Amendment protections simply by attacking the expenditure of 
money" (p. 113). Indeed, even with respect to newspapers, as Smith 
recognizes, the Supreme Court found in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan that the purchase and sale of newspaper ad space constituted 
First Amendment protected actions.21 Thus, even if money is not actu­
ally speech - even if it is best seen as "property," as Justice Stevens 
argued powerfully in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC22 -
it is still a kind of fungible property practically indispensable to the 
effectuation of speech and press activity in modern society. Without a 
free market in political money, Smith suggests, there will be no free 
market in political speech. 
With this market principle as his lodestar, Smith tells us it "is not 
exaggeration to say that campaign-finance 'reform' poses the greatest 
threat to free speech in America since the Alien and Sedition Acts two 
hundred years ago" (p. 87). In actuality that is an exaggeration and 
quite an unsettling one. Does Professor Smith forget the Palmer 
Raids, the prosecution of socialists and anarchists for opposing World 
War I, the incarceration of dissenters for dishonoring the American 
flag, the internment of Japanese Americans and foreign nationals 
during World War II, McCarthyism and Smith Act prosecutions and 
government witch hunts, the massive FBI surveillance and disruption 
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18. 
20. P. 112 (quoting J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitlltion: Is Money Speech?, 85 
YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
21. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
22. 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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of the Civil Rights Movement, Cointelpro and the sweeping prosecu­
tions and jailings of antiwar activists during the Vietnam period? Is it 
plausible that the "greatest threat to free speech in America since the 
Alien and Sedition Acts" is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2001? What does Professor Smith make of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
passed in the same year?23 One can well grasp the temptation experi­
enced by Professor Smith to assert the martyrdom of those newly 
minted civil libertarians courageously defending the free-speech rights 
of large corporations and millionaires, but let us not press a good joke 
too far. 
Leave aside the hyperbole that treats denying Philip Morris the 
right to buy jumbo-shrimp hospitality suites at the major-party 
national conventions as a greater assault on liberty than, say, sending 
presidential candidate Eugene Debs to a federal penitentiary for ten 
years for opposing World War I.24 In a formal doctrinal sense, the 
BCRA is not targeted at particular political-speech content, much less 
specific viewpoints, and any speech forbidden by way of the soft­
money ban can be easily effectuated through the expenditure of hard 
money by individuals. So our most important First Amendment 
warning signals are simply not flashing. 
At the same time, the conservative majority on the Court is likely 
to strike down the new "soft money" and "electioneering communica­
tions" provisions, as well as the provisions barring minors from 
making any federal contributions. The constitutional calculus involved 
in these issues is massively intricate, but the basic posture of the 
Court's ruling majority will be clear: Buckley25 and Shrink PAC26 
delineate the outer bounds of campaign-finance regulation to protect 
against quid pro quo corruption (and its appearance). Therefore, 
Congress cannot regulate political expression by corporations, unions, 
political parties, or individuals that does not involve either express 
advocacy or a direct candidate contribution. Yet, the major provisions 
of the BCRA sweep well beyond this understanding. This is likely to 
23. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 411(a), 1 1 5  Stat. 272, 346 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). For discussion 
of the USA PATRIOT Act's impact on free speech and other Bill of Rights guarantees, see 
John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Se­
curity": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PA TR/OT Act and the Justice Department's 
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081 ,  1096 (2002) (noting the USA PATRIOT 
Act's "deleterious effect on the sacrosanct protection of the First Amendment right to free 
speech"). 
24. See RAY G INGER, THE BENDING CROSS: A BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE VICTOR DEBS 
(Russell & Russell 1969) ( 1949). See generally EUGENE VICTOR DEBS, W ALLS AND BARS 
18-39 (Patterson Smith Publishing Corp. 1973) (1927) (recounting autobiographical experi­
ences in three county jails, the state penitentiary, and federal prison). 
25. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
26. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
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be the conservative Court majority's reaction, and it makes sense 
within this conceptual framework. 
THE CORPORATION AND CAMPAIGN-FINANCE LAW 
But something critical is missing from Smith's approach to the 
BCRA's ban on soft-money contributions to political parties. Indeed, 
the theoretical omission that permeates Smith's book is that there is 
no serious reckoning with the private corporation and what its proper 
role should be in federal and state political campaign activity. 
If private corporations chartered for economic purposes are consti­
tutionally protected political actors like citizens, as Smith repeatedly 
assumes, then it makes sense to describe a ban on their "issue ads" 
sixty days before an election as blatant interference with political free 
speech. If private corporations enjoy the same free-speech rights as 
membership associations like environmental groups, gun-owners' or­
ganizations, and unions, then it makes sense to treat the ban Oll' their 
soft-money contributions to political parties as interference with the 
formation of mutual political associations among citizens, as the anti­
BCRA plaintiffs allege.27 If the corporation is guaranteed the right to 
be an equal participant in elections like individual voters, the leading 
features of the BCRA surely must fail. 
But Smith's unreflective assimilation of private corporations into 
democratic politics cuts against strong currents in American political 
and constitutional thought, even among conservatives whose views on 
contribution and expenditure limits Smith otherwise applauds. The 
democratic state charters the private corporation to engage in 
economic activity that produces private wealth for the benefit ·of 
the common good. But the corporation is neither a natural-born nor 
naturalized democratic citizen; nor is it a membership group of 
citizens. It is a capital-ownership structure and legally defined entity 
that should enjoy no political rights under the Constitution. It has no 
constitutional standing outside of the independent individual rights of 
the people involved with it. 
To be sure, Smith's unthinking assumptions about corporations 
mirror the state of our procorporatist constitutional law. In First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court in 1978 struck 
down a Massachusetts law making it a crime for banks or business 
corporations to make political contributions or independent expendi­
tures to influence "the vote on any question submitted to the voters, 
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or 
27. See Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell et al. at 25-31,  
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 123 S. Ct. 2071 (2003). (No. 02-1674 et al . )  (alleging 
that Title I of the BCRA burdens significant speech and associational rights), available at 
http://www.camlc.org/advocacy-court2-34.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2003). 
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assets of the corporation. "28 The statute, passed out of frustration with 
corporate spending to defeat initiatives favoring progressive income 
taxes, defined initiatives respecting individual income taxes as 
categorically not affecting the interests of banks and corporations.29 
The Massachusetts legislature would have better focused our attention 
on the underlying problem by categorically banning all corporate­
initiative spending and contributions, but its legislation activated the 
constitutional struggle nonetheless. 
The parties to the case, the First National Bank and the Common­
wealth of Massachusetts, battled over whether corporations and banks 
have First Amendment rights to spend and give money in campaigns, 
a right that the Court had upheld with respect to persons two years 
before in Buckley v. Valeo.30 But the Court refused to explicitly decide 
whether corporations have First Amendment rights.31 It instead 
focused on whether the proposed speech itself was protected. Justice 
Powell wrote: 
The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First 
Amendment's protection . ... If the speakers here were not corporations, 
no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. 
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, 
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation 
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of 
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of 
its source, whether corporations, association, union, or individual.32 
Justice Powell's move was pure metaphysics. Speech does not exist in 
the abstract, waiting for the right m9ment to express itself. Speech has 
an irreducible material basis in the speaker, without whom the speech 
would not have content, meaning, or existence. So the whole issue was 
precisely whether corporations chartered by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts had a First Amendment right, in explicit opposition to 
Massachusetts law, to spend money from corporate treasuries to influ­
ence ballot-question campaigns. Recall that there was nothing in state 
law stopping individual corporate and bank executives, shareholders, 
or directors from expressing their personal views hostile to the 
progressive-income-tax initiative and spending their own money to try 
and stop it.33 The issue was whether they could take corporate-treasury 
money out of the till and spend it for these electoral purposes. 
28. 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
29. See id. 
30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
31. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. 
32. Id. at 776-77 (internal footnotes omitted). 
33. Id. at 787-88. 
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Since the speech affected was of the highest value, the Court 
applied strict scrutiny to the state's two suggested interests. The first 
interest suggested by Massachusetts was protecting democracy itself. 
The Court agreed that "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral 
process, preventing corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert 
responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise 
conduct of government' are interests of the highest importance."34 
But the problem with the state's democracy argument was that it 
depended on the assumption that corporate spending "would exert an 
undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and - in the 
end - destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process 
and the integrity of government."35 If these fears "were supported by 
record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened im­
minently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating 
rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would 
merit our consideration,"36 the majority stated. But "there has been no 
showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming 
or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that 
there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in gov­
ernment. "37 
This analysis left open the possibility that states could indeed ban 
corporate spending in campaigns if they showed that the corporate 
voice was "overwhelming" or even "significant," and threatened 
popular democracy.38 But the Court then quickly, and paradoxically, 
observed that: "To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the 
outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advo­
cacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it."39 
This reasoning is, of course, incoherent. The Court says at once 
that corporate speech might lose protection if it were to become at 
some point too effective and overwhelming, and then in the next 
breath, that its effectiveness could not be the basis for regulating it.40 
Which is it? 
The majority's embarrassing confusion on this point follows from 
its own persistent refusal to reckon seriously with what a corporation 
actually is.41 This failure becomes glaring in its consideration of the 
34. Id. at 788-89 (quoting United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957) 
(alteration in original)). 
35. Id. at 789. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 789-90 (internal footnote omitted). 
38. See id. 
39. Id. at 790. 
40. Id. 
41. See generally Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill 
of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L .J. 577 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court's treatment of the 
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second major interest invoked by Massachusetts to defend its law: its 
interest in "protecting the rights of shareholders whose views differ 
from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation."42 
The majority rejected this alleged interest in protecting dissenting 
shareholders because the statute was "both underinclusive and overin­
clusive" for these purposes.43 The law did not go far enough because it 
tolerated corporate lobbying to defeat or pass state legislation that 
certain shareholders might also disagree about and it did not ban cor­
porate spending on public issues that were not the subject of a public 
referendum.44 It also failed to target other associations such as unions 
and business trusts for the same treatment. Conversely, it swept too 
far because it prohibited "a corporation from supporting or opposing a 
referendum proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized 
the contribution or expenditure."45 Justice Powell noted that share­
holders who truly object can use the "procedures of corporate democ­
racy" to register their dissent or can bring a "derivative suit to chal­
lenge corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for 
improper corporate purposes."46 
Justice White, in his superb dissenting opinion joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, framed the issue as "whether a State may 
prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to 
propagate views having no connection with the corporate business."47 
He invoked the traditional "artificial entity" view of the corporation, 
an understanding that goes all the way back to conservative Chief 
Justice John Marshall: 
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of fur­
thering certain economic goals. In order to facilitate the achievement of 
such ends, special rules relating to such matters as limited liability, per­
petual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets are 
normally applied to them. States have provided corporations with such 
attributes in order to increase their economic viability and thus 
strengthen the economy generally. 48 
But Justice White pointed out the danger that these desirable eco­
nomic advantages could be converted into tyrannical political power, 
which could, in turn, be used to perpetuate special privileges for the 
personhood of corporations has been erratic and unsystematic, though tilting in a procorpo­
rate direction). 
42. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787. 
43. Id. at 793. 
44. Id. at 793-94. 
45. Id. at 794. 
46. Id. at 794. 
47. Id. at 803 (White, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting). 
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corporate class: "It has long been recognized . . .  that the special status 
of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts 
of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the 
economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral proc­
ess."49 Justice White conceded that Buckley v. Valeo rejected any 
public interest in "equaliz[ing] the financial resources available to 
candidates," but argued that Massachusetts's interest was quite differ­
ent from mere equality: 
It is not one of equalizing the resources of opposing candidates or op­
posing positions, but rather of preventing institutions which have been 
permitted to amass wealth as a result of special advantages extended by 
the State for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to ac­
quire an unfair advantage in the political process, especially where, as 
here, the issue involved has no material connection with the business of 
the corporation. The State need not permit its own creation to consume it. 
Massachusetts could permissibly conclude that not to impose limits upon 
the political activities of corporations would have placed it in a position 
of departing from neutrality and indirectly assisting the propagation of 
corporate views because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate 
acquisition of funds to finance such activities. 50 
The only problem with Justice White's opinion was that he character­
ized the state's democratic insistence on abolishing corporate influ­
ence over elections as a social "interest" to be weighed against corpo­
rate free-speech rights, rather than a logically prior definitional 
principle that corporations are not citizens. 
In his own fine dissent, Justice Rehnquist evinced his (one hopes) 
imperishable understanding of that point. To begin with, he seemed to 
doubt the solidity of the Supreme Court's 1886 decision, declaring the 
business corporation is a "person" within the meaning of Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection.51 He emphasized Chief Justice John 
Marshall's statement in the Dartmouth College case that a "corpora­
tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only 
those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."52 While Justice 
Rehnquist correctly defended the Court's prior findings that chartered 
media corporations have First Amendment freedoms and all proper­
tied corporations have a right not to have their property confiscated 
without due process of law, he strongly doubted whether ordinary 
business corporations should be construed to have constitutionally 
49. Id. (White, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 809-10 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
51.  Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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protected political rights. He could not see why "liberties of political 
expression" are "necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States 
permit commercial corporations to exist . . . .  Indeed, the States might 
reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic power to 
obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed."53 
Justice Rehnquist and the other dissenters thus had a much 
stronger hold on what a corporation really is and how we conceive of 
its role in our politics. After all, Congress categorically banned corpo­
rate contributions in federal election campaigns in 1907 in the Tillman 
Act,54 a prohibition that has been an uncontroversial mainstay in fed­
eral law ever since. If it is the case that the political speech that corpo­
rations want to promote in ballot-issue campaigns is constitutionally 
protected, as the majority determined in Bellotti55 and as Smith clearly 
believes, it is hard to see why the long-standing ban on direct corpo­
rate contributions to federal candidates is constitutional. It cannot be 
because an unusual danger of quid pro quo corruption exists within 
the meaning of Buckley v. Valeo.56 After all, if a reasonable limitation 
of $1,000 suffices to regulate "the reality or appearance of corrup­
tion"57 for. individual contributions, why not corporate ones? Why 
shouldn't corporate CEOs be allowed to write $1,000 checks -
pardon me, $2,000 checks, or actually in Smith's utopia, unlimited 
checks - to federal candidates right out .of their company treasuries 
whenever the spirit moves them? I do not think that Smith can explain 
what would be constitutionally wrong with this practice. Indeed, I 
suppose he figures nothing is. 
For those who still have some lingering democratic pride and resis­
tance to corporate aristocracy, the best explanation for our opposition 
to corporate intervention in politics is within the legislative history of 
the 1907 Tillman Act. Adam Winkler has written a fine article 
. explaining that, contrary to received wisdom, the "primary purpose of 
the ban on corporate campaign contributions" in the Tillman Act and 
parallel state laws was not to limit corporate political power generally, 
but more specifically "to prevent corporate managers from using 
stockholders' money to finance electoral politics."58 Winkler associates 
the extraordinary early twentieth-century political controversy over 
corporate and insurance company campaign contributions with the 
53. Id. at 826 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
54. Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 
u.s.c. § 441(b) (2003)). 
55. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
56. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
57. Id. at 48. 
58. Adam Winkler, Corporate Contribution Bans and the Separation of Ownership and 
Control in the Early Twentieth Century 1 -2 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
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profound anxieties caused by "the separation of ownership and 
control" in the modern corporation.59 Political reformers of the time 
"sought to ban corporate contributions primarily because such contri" 
butions were seen to be a serious misuse of 'other people's money.' "60 
The "political danger of corporate campaign financing" was not so 
much to the rest of democratic society but "to the members within the 
corporate organization, in particular the stockholders."61 It was their 
money being used, without their consent or knowledge, often against 
their own political interests, positions, and values. 
Winkler relates how several celebrated cases of life-insurance 
companies secretly pouring corporate-treasury funds into national 
Republican Party political campaigns provoked public outrage.62 The 
scandal of a New York life-insurance company corruption led to an 
investigation by the New York legislature's Armstrong Committee 
that, according to Upton Sinclair, "shook the nation to its depths."63 
The investigation revealed a pattern of corporate managers taking the 
money of "widows and orphans"64 out of corporate treasuries to 
bankroll politicians who wrote laws to entrench the managers' own 
power in the corporation. According to the Nation, the Armstrong 
investigation - which would propel a little-known corporate lawyer 
and law professor named Charles Evan Hughes to the governorship of 
New York and ultimately a seat on the Supreme Court - focused on 
"the corrupt alliance of insurance companies with great speculators 
and powerful politicians. "65 In the Tillman Act and similar state laws, 
the nation resolved to stop corporate managers from using "other 
people's money" - "the money . . stolen from men and women who 
toiled and slaved and saved pennies to pay premiums"66 - to advance 
the managers' selfish personal and corporate political agendas. 
Most Americans instinctively understand the external threat that 
corporate wealth and power pose to democratic institutions, but the 
closely connected logic of the internal threat to the rights of share­
holders and employees has largely escaped us in recent times - at 
least until the Enron scandal broke. Perhaps this heart-breaking scan­
dal will help us to reunite the external and internal dimensions of this 
old-fashioned critique of political participation by corporate execu-
59. Id. at 2. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 3. 
63. Id. at 31 (quoting UPTON SINCLAIR, THE BRASS CHECK: A STUDY OF AMERICAN 
JOURNALISM 31 (1919) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
64. Id. at 47. 
65. The Week, 81NATION473, 475 (1905). 
66. The Week, 81NATION433, 435 (1905). 
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tives brandishing other people's money. Top executives at Enron 
deployed their control over the corporate assets of the shareholders to 
spread very large soft-money campaign contributions around both 
political parties.67 Top Enron and Arthur Anderson executives also 
contributed direct hard money to a large group of key politicians, 
including fifty-one out of fifty-six members of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee and forty-nine out of seventy members of the 
House Financial Services Committee.68 In the decade before Enron's 
collapse, its leaders pumped nearly $6 million into federal campaigns 
and the two-party system to guarantee the ideology of energy " 
deregulation." 69 
The corporate managers' resulting political influence in Congress 
and in the Republican Party, which went all the way to President 
George W. Bush and the White House,70 shielded them from meaning­
ful official scrutiny and allowed them to entrench their power with 
respect to the shareholders. Enron executives thus used other people's 
money to enrich themselves beyond belief and to ingratiate them­
selves with politicians to insulate their lawless power from public 
accountability. When the company ultimately went bankrupt, the 
shareholders, many of them Enron employees, saw their life savings 
shrivel and vanish. 
If anything positive can come from this disaster and the crime 
sweeping corporate America, it will be a recognition that the BCRA's 
total ban on corporate soft-money contributions to national or state 
political parties, political committees, or candidates71 is constitutional 
because corporations do not have political rights under the Constitu­
tion. What is at stake is not just the rights of "dissenting sharehold­
ers," for this phrase trivializes the structural transgression. Dissenting 
or not, citizen-shareholders in democratically chartered corporations 
have a right not to have their money put to the management's partisan 
political uses. The rest of us have a corresponding right not to have the 
corporation - which is endowed with so many government blessings 
- exploited by incumbent managers to perpetuate and enlarge their 
own power. We also have a right not to give business-expense tax de­
ductions for corporate political contributions. What is at stake is the 
unjust enrichment and self-aggrandizement of a class of corporate 
managers determined to use "other people's money" to buy them­
selves greater power and freedom from public oversight and account­
ability. 
67. See Robert L. Borosage, Enron Conservatives, NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 4. 
68. See The Great Recusal, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 25, 2002, at 2. 
69. See Center for Responsive Politics, Enron and Anderson, at http://www.opensecrets. 
org/news/enron/index.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2002). 
70. See id. 
71. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 44 1(i) (2003). 
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Bellotti72 should be overruled, and Professor Smith should use his 
analytical gifts to focus on the question of whether corporations have a 
constitutional right to give money contributions to candidate cam­
paigns and engage in "express advocacy" on behalf of candidates. If 
not, why not? And, if they do not, why should corporations have a 
right to spend money on political issue ads to influence the opinions of 
civil society or to give massive soft-money donations to specific politi­
cal parties jockeying against others? Where do these political rights 
come from? Smith's equivocation on corporate political rights reflects 
a lack of serious reflection about what a corporation is and whether it 
makes sense to talk about corporations enjoying the political rights of 
citizens. 
Smith seems to think that the rest of society must resign itself to 
corporate interference in democratic politics because the benefits to 
corporations of winning political power and the risks to them of 
allowing natural citizens to govern are just too great: 
It is simply absurd to think that private actors will ignore rents made 
available to them by government action, and even more absurd to think 
that individuals or interests will allow the government to tax or regulate 
them, sometimes to the point of economic extinction, without attempting 
to influence who holds the reigns of power. (p. 194) . 
On this view, campaign spending is not some unquantifiably ethereal 
shouting in the wind, as Smith often invites us to believe, but a crucial 
strategic investment in the political environment. 
Must we assume, with Smith, that society is powerless to prevent 
political intervention and domination by rent-seeking corporate 
"private actors" and "interests"? Is it, in fact, absurd to try to control 
the political power of business corporations? Surely corporate 
employees, shareholders, and managers may exercise their individual 
free-speech rights and spend personal money to promote what they 
see as the society's best interests, even if their vision is congruent with 
larger corporate political priorities. But it is illogical and perverse that 
the officers of publicly chartered corporations should be empowered 
to spend corporate-treasury money to tell the larger democratic soci­
ety how to govern itself. The progress and integrity of democracy 
require a wall of separation between public elections and private 
corporations that will be as towering and impenetrable as the "wall of 
separation between church and state" advocated by Thomas Jefferson 
in his famous 1802 letter to the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut.73 
Indeed, if Professor Smith delved deeper into law-and-economics, 
he might even end up with a strong free-market argument on behalf of 
public campaign financing. For, as Smith understands, the system of 
72. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
73. THOMAS JEFF ERSON, W RITING S  510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1 984). 
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private and corporate fundraising invites massive rent-seeking by 
private interests that figure out that well-invested millions in the 
campaign cycle can produce hundreds of millions or billions of dollars 
in return public policy benefits, either in the form of tax breaks or 
direct state subsidies. Thus, the true champion of an undistorted mar­
ket economy should seek to oust rent-seeking strategic players in the 
campaign-finance game and liberate public officials from that kind of 
irrational .influence and power. Conservatives like to say, with Smith, 
that corporate rent-seeking is the product of .a large government as if 
corporations themselves were not directly involved in the expansion of 
the size and scope of government. This contradicts everything we 
know about the central role of corporations in driving the growth of 
the American state. 
The wall of separation between corporations and public elections 
is something we already insist upon when it comes to munidpal corpo­
rations. In a revealing case called Anderson v. City of Boston,74 the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1978 stopped the city of 
Boston from spending money to support a campaign for a progressive 
taxation "classification" proposal that was on a statewide referendum­
election ballot. Significantly, the municipal corporation of Boston was 
spending this money in direct opposition to private corporations 
which, in exercise of their Bellotti rights, were spending money to 
oppose the measure. The Anderson court speculated that "the First 
Amendment has nothing to do with this intra-state question of the 
rights of a political subdivision. "75 Yet, even assuming that this kind of 
municipal-corporate political speech was presumptively protected, the 
court found that Boston, Massachusetts had shown a "compelling 
interest in assuring the fairness of elections and the appearance of 
fairness in the electoral process," which justified its implicit ban on 
municipal expenditures in a referendum campaign.76 The court empha­
sized how fairness was advanced by keeping the city from "using 
public tax revenues to advocate a position which certain taxpayers 
oppose,"77 precisely the interest that the Bellotti Court dismissed when 
it came to private shareholders.78 The Anderson court characterized 
Boston's view as suggesting that "the Commonwealth is apparently 
powerless against political entities of its own creation," precisely the 
terms in which Justice White castigated the argument made by private 
corporations and banks in Bellotti.79 
74. 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978). 
75. Anderson, 380 N.E.2d at 637. 
76. Id. at 638. 
77. Id. at 639. 
78. First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
79. Anderson, 380 N.E.2d at 639; see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-10 (White, J., dissent­
ing). 
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The current state of the law leaves us with an indefensible asym­
metry: private-corporate managers can spend to the heavens in pursuit 
of their political objectives while municipal corporations can spend 
nothing even if, as in the Anderson case, the elected representatives of 
the people on the city council overwhelmingly authorize and approve 
it. This imbalance swells the power of private corporations, leaving 
municipal corporations at their mercy. It probably makes sense to 
view municipal corporations as without free-speech rights since they 
are artificial entities that should effectuate the public will rather than 
try to shape it. On the other hand, in a statewide election, if private 
corporations are going to campaign for or against ballot issues and 
spend other people's money (almost always without their knowledge 
or consent) on such a campaign, then surely cities or towns with spe­
cific regional and political commitments should be able to make the 
parallel choice. In fact, the argument in support of municipal corpora­
tions is even more compelling, since democratic accountability is much 
stronger in localities and their participation is badly needed to coun­
teract the political power of private corporations. But the cleanest 
solution would be for the Court to recognize that no corporation, 
public or private, has a constitutionally protected right to spend or 
contribute money in electoral politics. 
To be sure, the BCRA's ban on union and individual soft-money 
contributions to political parties is probably unconstitutional. Unions 
are just democratically governed groups of citizens who put their own 
money into the union treasury for common political purposes. When 
they want to spend money to promote political party-building activi­
ties, political education or get-out-the-vote drives, they are not con­
verting anyone else's money into their own political power nor are 
they exploiting a socially created capital-accumulation vehicle for 
illegitimate political purposes. The ubiquitous but intellectually lazy 
linkage of unions with corporations, both in law and in scholarship like 
Smith's (p. 28), reflects a cheap moral and political equivalency that 
has prevailed at least since the time of the Taft-Hartley Act.80 Unions 
are membership organizations whose members associate for the 
purpose of exercising their First Amendment political rights. Corpora­
tions are ownership structures that do not have members but share­
holders, employees, and Boards of Directors, all organized into a 
closely regulated legal hierarchy for economic purposes. 
Smith's apparent lack of appreciation for the historical and social 
meaning of corporate power Undermines the utility of his healthy 
80. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, § 304, 
61 Stat. 136 (1 947), amended by 1 8  U.S.C. § 610 (1948) (repealed 1976). Current prohibitions 
on union contributions to political campaign electioneering are contained in the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441 (b) (2003);  see also p. 28 (discussing limitations 
on union political contributions in the Smith-Connally Act). 
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libertarian instincts. If he at least wrestled conceptually with the 
corporation, he could return to assure us that corporations are indeed 
functional citizens protected by the First Amendment and deserving of 
all of the constitutional political rights that human citizens enjoy. On 
this view, the Tillman Act would have to be tossed out along with the 
BCRA. Corporations would then become the unquestioned masters of 
our politics and government, just as they are now the unquestioned 
masters of our economy. This would not be any democrat's utopian 
fantasy, but there would be a clean logic to it. 
Alternatively, Smith might report back that political liberty 
belongs to persons, not to state-chartered vehicles of wealth accumula­
tion, and that the substantial constitutional protection already ex­
tended to corporate political power has been a costly conceptual error 
that has serviced not political freedom but inequality and aristocratic 
privilege. At that point, we could have a serious discussion about how 
to secure the people maximum political liberty while taming the state's 
own ravenous creature, in Justice White's clarifying terms.81 
Perhaps the best way to do that, given the high costs of media 
campaigning, would be to develop a public finance regime based on 
reclaiming the public airwaves (at least partially) during election 
season for the purpose of providing free air time to federal candidates. 
Right now candidates spend more than a billion dollars in a federal 
election year buying television- and radio-broadcast time on airwaves 
that "we, the people" actually own but stupidly give away to mega­
corporations, who charge us for the privilege of engaging in campaign 
discourse. But change here has proven terribly difficult because the 
broadcast industry is itself extremely powerful. It awards millions of 
dollars in campaign contributions to friendly legislators and intimi­
dates politicians through its control over the media. Thus, one obvious 
cure for corporate domination of our politics - having the people 
reclaim our airwaves for political free speech - is being frustrated by 
the disease of corporate political power itself. 
Yet, Smith sees nothing wrong with the way that our broadcast in­
dustry is organized other than the distant threat that political candi­
dates will one day get to appear on the air without paying a large cor­
poration for the privilege (p. 141). "The network has a right to operate 
its property," he insists, apparently perfectly oblivious to the political 
origins of this property (p. 141). "To paraphrase the Declaration of 
Independence, government is instituted to preserve ·such rights," 
Smith solemnly declares (p. 141). In fact, these corporate "rights" in 
the public airwaves only exist because the government created and 
currently regulates them. So why should we elevate these delegated 
property rights of the broadcast licensee over the political rights of the 
81. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J,, dissenting) ("The State need not permit its 
own creation to consume it."). 
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candidates and voters to have a campaign process with televised free 
speech? In a political democracy, it is a matter of unfulfilled common­
sense to pass legislation conditioning broadcast licenses on surrender 
of substantial time for debates and candidate appearances during the 
election season. Smith allows that, as "a philosophical matter, such a 
statute may be well and good." But, as "a constitutional matter, it is 
exactly what the First Amendment prohibits when free speech is at 
stake" (p. 142). 
But surely the government is not prevented by the First Amend­
ment from saving a certain number of airwave hours for political de­
bate when it awards broadcast licenses. Yet, to justify precisely this 
paradoxical position, Smith invokes a series of judicial decisions up­
holding the exclusion of third party and independent candidates from 
candidate debates sponsored by public television networks (p. 142 
n.13). No self-respecting champion of free speech should have any 
word of praise for judicial decisions upholding a government practice 
that taxes citizens of all views to promote exclusionary television 
debates between candidates representing two points of view. This 
selective and one-sided conscription of public support for particular 
political ideas cuts against our deepest understandings of democratic 
liberty. As Thomas Jefferson argued on behalf of his 1779 statute for 
religious freedom, "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money 
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, 
is sinful and tyrannical. "82 Smith essentially invites us to believe that 
if a broadcast entity sponsors a debate between a Democratic and 
Republican congressional candidate and freezes out an Independent, 
our free-speech sympathies should lie not with the excluded candidate 
but with the broadcaster, who logically has the right to have the 
Independent arrested if he or she dares to show up.83 Some libertari­
anism, some democrat. 
Smith also misplaces his libertarian instincts when trying to refute 
several arguments that I have made in the past about our state-
82. T HOM AS J EF F ERSON, J EFF ERSON' S L ITERARY COMM ONPLACE BOOK 41 (Douglas 
L .  Wilson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1989) (1928). 
83. In the leading case, Arkansas Education Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 
666 (1998), a state-run cable channel excluded an Independent candidate for Congress from 
a televised debate between his Democratic and Republican rivals. When Forbes showed up 
at the station, he was turned away and told the station would rather show reruns of St. Else­
where than conduct the debate with him in it. This is now a fairly common scenario, and one 
that achieved national attention in 2000 when the Commission on Presidential Debates, a 
private corporation, called out Massachusetts State Troopers to threaten Green Party presi­
dential candidate Ralph Nader with arrest for showing up at its first George Bush-Al Gore 
debate at the University of Massachusetts. See, e.g., Nader Tossed Off Grounds at Debate 
Site: Thousands Protest Variety of Issues (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 3, 2003) (reporting 
Nader's expulsion from the 2000 Presidential Debate in Boston, where state officers threat­
ened him with arrest). For a complete analysis of the lawfulness of debate exclusion by both 
state and corporate actors, see Jamin 8. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 77 T EX AS L. 
REV. 1943 (1999). 
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engineered "wealth primary."  In an article I wrote with John Bonifaz, 
we argued that Equal Protection compels the government, at a mini­
mum, to provide subsidies to challengers equal to the most obviously 
political self-subsidies engineered by incumbent members of Congress, 
such as the franking privilege, which allows congressional members to 
use their official budget for mailings to their constituents,84 taxpayer­
funded press secretaries, schedulers, and speechwriters.85 Smith takes 
lengthy issue with the suggestion that these extensive government­
conferred subsidies and political advantages translate into state action. 
He argues: "Finding state action in the mere fact that some people are 
officeholders seems a dubious proposition, for it would place state 
action at the center of all aspects of public discourse" (p. 156). But, of 
course, there is state action at the center of public discourse when 
incumbent government leaders selectively substitute public resources 
for private campaign funds to reach the electorate on behalf of their 
own ambitions. As in Terry v. Adams,86 we find in today's wealth pri­
mary "an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with state 
power . . .  [in an] effort to . . .  subvert what is formally the law,"87 
which here is supposed to be a private competition for funds without 
state subsidies. Smith, further, dislikes the argument that proincum­
bent state action can be found in the enactment of special-interest 
legislation profiting particular donors, which in turn spurs further 
contributions to the same incumbents. "This theory raises more 
questions than it answers," Smith writes (p. 156) , and this certainly is 
true. The argument forces us to recognize that we have a mature 
political and social system and the only sensible and just way to 
organize fair and open campaigns is through a public system. 
In the final analysis, Smith leaves us with an effective diatribe 
against muddled reformers who think that there is something intrinsi­
cally progressive about capping any kind of political campaign giving 
and spending we can lay our hands on. But, having gone for this easy 
target, Smith does not ask himself the hard questions about the struc­
tural place of private corporations in American democracy or the law­
fulness of official contrivances favoring incumbents, much less how we 
might rearrange things for greater public participation or a more effec­
tive exercise of political liberty by citizen�. His book reduces to an 
eloquent plea for doing nothing but opposing reform. 
· 
84. See U.S. House of Representatives, Franking Commission: What is the Frank?, at 
http://www.house.gov/cha/franking/what_is_the_frank_/body_what_is_the_frank_.html (last 
visited May 30, 2002) (explaining the historical development of the franking privilege since 
its introduction to the American Continental Congress in 1775). 
85. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 Y ALE 
L. & PO L' Y  REV. 273 (1993). 
86. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
87. Terry, 345 U.S. at 473-74. 
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II. 
In their intriguing and spirited little manifesto for a massive 
voucher solution to the agonies of campaign-finance reform, Bruce 
Ackerman and Ian Ayres provide us with what is, at the very least, a 
provocative thought experiment about how we might broaden the 
circle of political participation to overcome the plutocratic dynamics 
of the current regime. Their meticulously detailed multibillion dollar 
plan for "patriot dollars" is sweepingly ambitious, gimmicky in parts, 
and also sometimes infected with the same ideologically saturated pre­
legal-realist romance with "markets" that permeates Smith's work. 
But both the book's great virtues and its serious flaws point us in 
the direction of a real alternative to the depressing cycle of money 
domination and command-and-control regulation that infuses many 
recent reform dynamics. For the truly viable alternative today origi­
nates - what do you know? - not from conservative or liberal law 
professors but from voters in several states who have overcome the 
opposition of incumbent politicians to pass by initiative impressively 
effective "clean-money" voluntary public finance programs. 
Yet, Ackerman and Ayres are not much interested in the clean­
money movement that has triumphed in Arizona, Massachusetts, 
Maine, and Vermont.88 In these states, legislative candidates who 
choose to participate can qualify for a set amount of public funding 
(usually pegged to the costs of victory in the last election) by first 
raising a certain threshold number of $5 contributions. This system 
allows large numbers of people, without regard to their wealth or 
poverty, to participate in the seeding of campaigns; it allows candi­
dates, once they have qualified for the public funding, to spend time 
on campaigning rather than simply fundraising by granting them equal 
state subsidies; and it reduces overall the power of big private money 
in politics and government. As dictated by Buckley, candidates who 
choose to run outside of the public system can continue to raise and 
spend private money (under different state contribution limits).89 
To Ackerman and Ayres, the clean-money regime smacks of "a 
centralized process - replete with heavy-handed requirements that 
favor incumbents, entrench existing parties, and alienate citizens from 
funding decisions" (p. 3). This unsubstantiated characterization is 
deeply at odds with all of the early evidence we have about the fairly 
88. See generally Representative Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Hori­
zon for Campaign Finance Reform, 37 H ARV. J. ON L EG IS. 307 (2000) (highlighting the tri­
umph of clean-money ballot initiatives in Maine, Massachusetts, and Arizona); Miles Rapo­
port & Jason Tarricone, Election Reform's Next Phase: A Broad Democracy Agenda and the 
Need for a Movement, 9 G EO. J. ON POV ERTY L. & POL'Y 379, 398-401 (2002) (showing that 
successful clean-money initiatives in Arizona, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts are 
promising models for broad democratic reform of our nation's money politics). 
89. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
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remarkable success of the clean-money reforms, which have substan­
tially increased the number of new and outsider candidates, precipi­
tated the ouster of large numbers of incumbents, and generally 
increased the openness of the political process.90 These successes have 
come without the creation of any big, coercive bureaucracy, a driving 
fear of the authors. Indeed, the government effort implied by clean 
money pales next to their own vision of a renovated and expanded 
Federal Election Commission made up of five "retired federal judges" 
(p. 129) who name and oversee the heads of three new bureaucratic 
divisions assigned with fetchingly complex responsibilities (p. 132). 
In any event, the state-based clean-money option is not the federal 
plan that the authors promote. Their plan certainly has its own great 
virtues - simplicity, unfortunately, not being one of them. The 
authors (along with a third collaborator, Danton Berube) experiment 
with different numbers, provisions, and requirements along the way, 
so perhaps it is best to follow the model statute that they provide at 
the end of the book (pp. 181-85). 
The central feature of their "$5 billion plus program" (p. 42) is the 
introduction of "patriot dollars,'' a guaranteed $50 subsidy that every 
American citizen will receive from the government in order to make 
federal campaign contributions either to candidates, political action 
committees, or political advocacy groups. Once a voter has registered 
for a "patriot card" by mail, Internet, at the voting booth, or at the 
voter registrar's office, he or she will receive on his or her card four 
"subaccounts," including $10 for House elections, $15 for senatorial 
elections; and $25 for presidential elections. If, however, there is an 
incumbent president seeking reelection, the $25 subaccount is divided 
between $10 for the presidential primary and $15 for the general 
election (p. 182). All Patriot contributions by citizens must be made 
"anonymously" to candidates or political organizations through a 
"Blind Trust" set up by the Federal Election Commission (p. 183). 
With tens of millions of newly empowered donors, there would be 
a huge and salutary influx of new cash for political expression and 
millions of new participants in political campaigns, spreading out and 
opening up a fundraising system that has grown elitist and self­
referential. The authors estimate that, whereas "$3 billion flowed into 
the campaign coffers of all aspirants for federal office" in the 2000 
elections, "in contrast, $5 billion or so would be coming into the cam­
paign through the patriotic system" (p. 7). 
Yet, the authors do not wish to use the tidal wave of new patriotic 
money to completely oust the system of elite-dominated private con­
tributions that constitute our "wealth primary."91 On the contrary, 
·90. See Public Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform, at http://www.publicam 
paign.org/clean_main.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). 
91. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 85. 
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they would not only continue the right to give money contributions to 
candidates but also would deliberately raise the hard-money private 
contribution limits from what they are today under McCain-Feingold, 
to what they cheerfully concede is "a stratospheric height that will be 
practically insignificant to all but the very richest Americans" (p. 48). 
They propose a $100,000 limit for gifts to presidential candidates, 
$100,000 for gifts to national political parties during presidential 
political cycles, $15,000 for gifts to Senate candidates, and $5,000 for 
gifts to House candidates (p. 184). Furthermore, before patriot dolla.rs 
even kick in, the authors . would allow federal candidates to raise 
money for exploratory funds, including up to $50,000 for House 
candidates, $250,000 for Senate candidates, and $1 million for 
presidential candidates. Individual donors would be allowed to 
contribute up to $2,000, $10,000, and $20,000 to each of these kinds of 
funds. 
Now, the authors are convinced that dramatic increases in private 
giving will not translate into more plutocracy. They keep this faith for 
several reasons. The first is the innovation of which they seem most 
proud: the "secret donation booth," which emphatically challenges the 
standard reform dogma that full contribution disclosure is critical to 
democracy (p. 25).  Just as voters cast their ballots in secret, Ackerman 
and Ayres argue, voters-as-donors should make their contributions 
secretly to the FEC's Blind Trust, which will then deposit the contri­
butions into designated registered candidate accounts according to 
various intricate camouflaging formulae.92 As a matter of course, the 
Commission will keep secret the information of who gave how much 
to whom. But if "a contributor requests, the Blind Trust will publicly 
disclose the amount the contributor has given up to $200" (p. 183). 
But the records of large donations are not published - that is, until 
they are all made public ten years after the fact (an interval that 
perhaps shows a naive lack of faith in the longevity of grudges 
harbored by American politicians). 
Furthermore, the authors have devised an intricate "secrecy 
algorithm," found in Appendix B (pp. 227-31),  to disguise all contribu­
tions through manipulation of the timing and amounts of the FEC's 
release of donated money into the blind trusts. Even if a donor 
literally shows a candidate a cancelled check he wrote to the Blind 
Trust earmarked to the candidate's campaign for $5,000, this too is to 
no avail, according to the authors. For they have cleverly provided 
92. For example, if 
the Blind Trust receives an unusually large amount of contributions from an unusually con­
centrated number of donors, it will report only a randomized amount of contributions 
(ranging from one standard deviation below to two standard deviations above the mean 
daily receipts) and will attribute excess amounts over a ten-day period. 
P. 183. 
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that any contributor may rescind any contribution "within five days" 
of making it or may "instruct the Blind Trust in advance to send a re­
fund check" even if the check is cashed (p. 183). Since sneaky faux­
donors will trick politicians, there will be "a regime of cheap talk" (p. 
28) and no candidate can ever be absolutely sure that any person actu­
ally made a contribution over $200. 
What are we to make of this delightful proposal? Its virtues are 
plain. Patriot dollars will "invite millions to take a small but active role 
throughout the election campaign" (p. 15). Patriot donors "will be 
giving renewed social meaning to their self-understanding as free and 
equal citizens, engaging in democratic deliberation" (p. 15). This "citi­
zenship effect" will engender an "agenda effect" as "candidates and 
political organizations will soon learn that they need not rely on the 
small elite of private-money donors but can · finance themselves 
through broad-based appeals to the patriotic citizenry" (p. 15). It 
could actually make possible the development of new political forma­
tions, networks, and perhaps even parties. 
Furthermore, through various complex-trigger mechanisms, the 
plan guarantees that patriot dollars will always represent two-thirds of 
total campaign giving, even with the proposed lifting of limits on 
private giving, so that the impact of private contributions is contained 
(p. 51 ). Since private wealth in politics has recently dominated the 
public agenda and national budgetary priorities, reducing private 
fundraising to a minority portion of total campaign funds can begin to 
emancipate the public to choose new policy directions. 
But, as with Smith, there are significant unstated assumptions in 
the argument, and vexing unanswered questions. To begin with, it is 
not at all clear that the seemingly inspired secret "donation booth" 
addresses the real problem of corruption in the political process: The 
authors proceed on the premise that corruption follows mainly from 
politicians receiving large gifts from individual donors and knowing 
the identity of these donors. The painfully elaborate time-release­
camouflage mechanism in their "donation booth" scheme is designed 
to sow doubt and confusion as to whether someone is really giving 
cash to a candidate. But their assumption is that most contributions 
come from arms-length relationships among strategic political inves­
tors. This is problematic, for many campaign investors are deeply and 
organically rooted as political allies, fundraisers, compatriots, and 
friends of the politicians they support. Thus, while there may be a sly 
trickster here and there who fools a politician into thinking he gave 
when he really did not, the vast majority of big donors will caucus with 
politicians, party with them, and strategize together for victory. They · 
have no interest in tricking their endorsed politicians by secretly with­
holding their money since they want to see them win. Most donors 
share thick ideological, class, and professional connections to the poli-
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tician. The contribution is not a kind of contract between them but the 
expression of a common world view and political project. 
Thus, real corruption does not come from individual candidates 
knowing for certain who gave them money, but rather from organized 
money - a chief source of social inequality - operating outside of its 
proper sphere of market influence to dominate political life and dis­
tribute the opportunities of candidates and citizens to speak, persuade, 
and debate. The Supreme Court came much closer to understanding 
this sense of corruption in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
when it defined corruption not as quid pro quo arrangements but as 
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form" and 
are spent on influencing political outcomes but that reflect the will of 
rich corporations, rather than the public's political ideas and choices.93 
Thus, it is necessary to ask why the authors do not simply get rid of 
the private donation booth and completely socialize opportunities for 
candidacy with their Patriot plan. If we are going to spend $5 billion of 
public money on the exceedingly complex patriot dollar system -
already quadrupling or quintupling the amount of money in the fed­
eral campaign process - why not strike a complete blow for demo­
cratic equality and abolish private campaign contributions? After all, 
the authors recognize that, in recent federal elections, one-tenth of 
one percent of the public gave one-half of the total campaign money 
raised (p. 31), and the vast majority of Americans give no private con­
tributions at all. Does it not complete the democratic logic of equal 
public funding to give everyone, as much as possible, an equal money 
stake in politically funded campaigns in the same way we all have an 
equal vote? Why not structure the patriot system in such a way that 
candidates must either choose to go patriot or go private but have no 
intermediate option for a "mixed system"? (p. 33). Candidates and 
voters would be invited to identify with either public values and 
resources or private values and resources, a choice that would take on 
different meanings at different points in time. 
The authors are not immune to the logical force of the "abolition­
ist argument," but seem to reject it, albeit reluctantly, for a hodge­
podge of reasons. The first is the "realist caution" that, even "if the 
abolitionist proposal were adopted, there would be many other ways 
for the rich to project their influence" (p. 32). Of course, on this 
familiar, depressing theory, we should abandon the whole enterprise 
of campaign reform, as indeed Professor Smith urges us to do. 
Regardless of what we do, the rich will control their own newspapers, 
their own television stations, and various other bullhorns, so why not 
let them keep their own politicians and privately bankrolled 
93. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990). 
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campaigns as well? Indeed, on this reasoning, it is not entirely clear 
why we should maintain laws against political bribery. After all, there 
will always be many other ways for the "rich to project their 
influence," so why not let them buy the will of politicians directly, 
which also has the virtue of being supremely efficient? 
But surely the point of democratic progress against the tyranny of 
wealth is to radically separate what is properly a market commodity 
from what is not. The opportunities to run for office, to communicate 
as a candidate, or to influence legislation should not be market com­
modities bought and sold according to the whims and vicissitudes of 
those with financial capital. We can surely embrace a "mixed system" 
with respect to generalized background political discussion (what is 
now called "issue speech") such that we can have both publicly subsi­
dized speech, like public-cable-television networks, as well as privately 
controlled speech, like newspapers. But the opportunity for the 
wealthy to own their own newspapers or television stations hardly 
justifies allowing them the further opportunity to project financial 
power into the public sphere of campaign speech. Let them allocate 
their $50 like everyone else. If it's good enough for the poor, it's good 
enough for the rich. 
But Ackerman and Ayres argue, much like the campaign-finance 
romantic Bradley Smith, that making campaign contributions is "one 
of many ways Americans show that they care about the fate of the 
country, and thereby encourage others to engage in the enterprise of 
active citizenship" (p. 34). Here, private giving is not seen as a threat 
to democratic values but as the very embodiment of them. "Flatly 
prohibiting private campaign contributions would be a real loss to the 
civic culture - especially when we consider how the social meaning of 
small gifts will change within the new regime of campaign finance" (p. 
34). That is, some patriot donors will get so invested in the success of 
their favorite candidates that they will decide to throw personal dol­
lars after patriot dollars. This should be seen as virtuous, not corrupt­
ing. More importantly, in the early stages of the campaign, when most 
citizens are not focused enough to donate their patriot dollars, the pri­
vate "donation booth is a means for more active citizens to put their 
money where their mouth is" (p. 36) and launch candidacies with big 
money contributions. This function is especially important, say the 
authors, to enable minor parties and their candidates to get off the 
ground (pp. 36-37). 
Many of these arguments indeed sound an echo of Professor 
Smith's elegiac defense of private giving. Smith, for example, praises 
campaign fundraising as the most open and democratic form of politi­
cal participation for ordinary, busy people.94 Yet, there are some hard 
94. P. 82 ("For most Americans, the best way to convert their talents to influence is 
through cash contributions.") . 
1562 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1532 
questions we need to ask Ackerman and Ayres. If everyone has fifty 
patriot dollars to spend, why doesn't the use of this (public) private 
money already sufficiently show that these voters "ca.re. about the fate 
of their country" and "thereby encourage others to · engage in the 
enterprise of active citizenship"? Is everything public to be automati­
cally denigrated, even patriot dollars? Would it really represent a loss 
to the civic culture to ask candidates to choose between the patriot 
system and the wealth primary? 
The argument that early private money will be crucial to propel 
candidacies suggests not a virtue but a problem with the design of the 
patriot plan. Recall that the authors would allow federal candidates to 
raise large private-money contributions for exploratory funds, includ­
ing up to $50,000 for House candidates, $250,000 for Senate candi­
dates, and $1 million for presidential candidates. Individual donors 
would be allowed to contribute up to $2,000, $10,000, and $20,000 to 
each of these kinds of funds. This regime allows candidates to raise 
private-money contributions to spend on soliciting patriot contribu­
tions. But this pattern reincarnates the problem the plan is trying to 
address. For candidates will raise big private contributions to invest in 
media to tell voters to send in their patriot - and private - dollars to 
their campaigns. There will thus be a private-money chase to spend on 
a patriot and private-dollar chase, making the campaign a kind of re­
lay race for money. And the distribution of patriot dollars will come to 
mimic and echo, rather than replace, the distribution of private 
dollars. The idea that this will benefit minor political parties and 
candidates is unsubstantiated by the authors and seems farfetched 
given the way private fundraising clearly benefits incumbents and their 
parties today. 
Indeed, we can go further at this point and ask the more funda­
mental question: Granted that the Patriot plan usefully gets more 
people involved in the campaign-giving process and would mark a 
major improvement over the status quo, why should the capacity of 
candidates to reach the electorate with their campaign message de­
pend on their ability to raise money from the electorate in the first 
place, whether it is from patriot contributions or checkbooks? 
Consider a U.S. House race in which the incumbent "major party" 
candidate raises $1 million (two-thirds in patriot donations and one­
third in private donations), the other "major party" challenger raises 
$500,000 (in the same ratio), and a "minor party" challenger raises 
$100,000 (in the same ratio). Now, assume that the amount of money 
raised will roughly translate into the candidates' capacity to purchase 
and engage in political communication (which is, in essence, the whole 
premise of the ruling in Buckley v. Valeo that expenditure caps are 
unlawful "quantity restrictions" on political speech).95 The incumbent 
95. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
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will have double the exposure and opportunity to communicate as his 
or her major-party challenger and five times that of his or her minor­
party challenger. 
But why? To be sure, we have structured the mass-media market 
in a way that shampoomakers will obtain differential access to the 
public mind, but should the same market approach govern candidates 
for the same public office from different political parties? Surely a dif­
ferent norm should operate here: democratic equality. At its founda­
tion, modern democracy insists upon the hard-won principle of one­
person, one-vote. In the setting of legislative floor debates over par­
ticular issues, it calls for one party-one equal bloc of time, with floor 
leaders divvying up the minutes among the members waiting their turn 
to speak. In Supreme Court oral arguments, contending sides in a 
battle get precisely the same amount of time to plead their case 
regardless of their wealth or the popularity of their cause. 
When it comes to the mass media that operate on the people's air­
waves and the people's minds, surely the principle of democratic 
equality also calls for debates and forums in which candidates receive 
equal floor time regardless of how much money they have or have 
raised or which political party they represent. It similarly calls for the 
award of equal free television time to candidates to make their pitch. 
It is these standards, so familiar to the rest of the democratic world, 
that we lose sight of when we simply continue and accelerate the 
money chase with an otherwise attractive universal subsidy. It would 
obviously be much cheaper for us as a society to save the money on 
the expensive Patriot plan and simply force the television networks to 
give us some of our time back so we can award it equally among the 
candidates. 
This approach would have a truly catalytic effect on third parties 
and Independents. Outsider candidates cannot presently compete with 
the money-drenched insider parties and are routinely closed out of 
both public and private debates that favor the exclusionary "two party 
system" whose candidates wear their major-party tags like a "title of 
nobility."96 But this public airtime approach puts our (weak) commit­
ment to multi-party democracy to the test. The self-perpetuating "two 
party system" presupposes that "major party" candidates should never 
have to debate candidates of lesser parties, who are presumed to be 
frivolous, nonviable, or even crazy. 
Yet, we have seen how outsider candidates, once allowed to 
debate, can change the dynamics of a race - and win. In 1998, Jesse 
96. My allusion, of course, is to the constitutional prohibition against congressional 
members awarding "titles of nobility" to themselves. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. For a 
detailed examination of the problem of "debate gerrymandering" and the entrenchment of 
the extra-constitutional "two party system," see Jamin B. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 
77 TEXAS L. REV. 1943 (1999). 
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Ventura stunned the Minnesota establishment by winning the state's 
governorship after a maverick run in which he was allowed to partici­
pate in ten candidate debates with his Democratic and Republican 
opponents. Ross Perot captured an astonishing 19% of the popular 
vote in the 1992 presidential election after he was allowed to debate 
President George Bush and then-governor Bill Clinton. Congressman 
Bernie Sanders won election to the House of Representatives from 
Vermont in 1990 as an Independent after being trounced in four ear­
lier statewide races. The exclusion of "minor party" candidates from 
debates is an article of faith for the self-entrenching "two party 
system" not because they are frivolous and destined to lose, but 
because they are serious and might win. 
In sum, Ackerman and Ayres err in assuming that a candidate's 
current ability to raise money - even in a broad egalitarian pool -
should determine his or her opportunity to speak to the public. This is 
a right, along with the right to debate one's opponents, that should be 
foundational. Now, certainly candidates should have the opportunity 
to pair off and square off with just one other candidate. "Major party" 
candidates could merge their individual time allotments to hold an ex­
clusive "major party candidate" debate, a right that clearly seems im­
plied by Supreme Court decisions like Hurley97 and Dale.98 But surely 
we should condition a candidate's general right to participate in a 
public finance regime on his or her acceptance of at least one debate 
challenge with all qualified candidates appearing together. Can 
democracy require any less than at least one formal public debate? 
Like Smith, Ackerman and Ayres join conservative criticism of 
McCain-Feingold's ban on electioneering communications. "We reject 
this effort to expand the regulatory net," they declare (p. 54). But it is 
a mistake, as we have seen, to conflate corporations and unions and 
assume that they should have the same political free-speech rights. If 
we follow conservative Justices like Rehnquist and White, we can 
understand the corporation to be a legally created social vehicle for 
wealth accumulation without constitutionally rooted political rights. A 
union, on the other hand, is a membership organization whose money 
comes from the members' political commitments. Interference with its 
right to mention officeholders within a certain period of elections does 
indeed seem, as McCain-Feingold's critics tell us, to be a direct assault 
97. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) 
(holding that a public accommodations law requiring private citizens who organized a pa­
rade to include among the marchers a group whose message the organizers did not wish to 
convey violated the organizers' First Amendment rights); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Both cases stand for the proposition that private persons may 
choose the participants of the forum in which they convey their message. 
98. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (holding that a public-accommodations law prohibiting the Boy 
Scouts' selective admissions policies violated the organization's First Amendment right of 
expressive association). 
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on speech. Treating corporations and unions as peas in a pod has 
political appeal but little logical coherence as First Amendment 
doctrine. In the face of massive corporate criminality and interference 
with our politics, we need much clearer thinking about the constitu­
tional status of corporate power. 
In the final analysis, Ackerman and Ayres have structured a help­
ful, detailed blueprint for substantially modifying, if not entirely trans­
forming, our Wild West federal campaign-finance roundup. To many 
conservative readers, like Professor Smith perhaps, the blueprint will 
smack of an overgrown Hillary Clinton-style national campaign­
finance bureaucracy, despite the authors' passionate protests that they 
want to remain market driven. To more radical democrats who have 
already cast their lot with the promising state-based clean-money re­
forms, this plan hatched at Yale Law School may look like a 
distraction from a popular movement that is forcing candidates on the 
ground to choose between public- and private-financing plans and in 
the process, liberating state elections from the tyranny of big money. 
But Professors Ackerman and Ayres have developed a plan and 
laid a marker in the sand for campaign vouchers, just as Professor 
Smith has developed a plan - that of no plan at all - and hoisted the 
flag of libertarian deregulation. All are to be commended for their 
intellectual seriousness as our activist conservative Court takes up 
McCain-Feingold. Whatever happens, we will need new paradigms 
and new ideas to face the awesome dilemma of reconciling private 
money with public elections, and market economics with democratic 
politics. 
